July 23, 2012              Brian Lewis, Ballarat, Australia

DIFFICULTIES WITH UTILITARIANISM  

Critics of utilitarianism point out a number of shortcomings in the theory. It could sometimes be very burdensome to require each action we contemplate doing to be evaluated by a weighing up of good and bad consequences. This would unduly complicate the living of a healthy moral life. Secondly, it is often difficult to foresee what the consequences of a course of action will be. Hence it is often very difficult to rank consequences without bringing in other non-utilitarian considerations, such as special concern for the underprivileged.  

But, apart from the problems of impracticality and evaluation of good and bad consequences, a third problem with utilitarianism is that it sometimes leads to conclusions counter to people's moral instincts, for example, that it is legitimate to sacrifice one human life to save a number of others.  

At first sight this third question may not seem unreasonable. Taking a human life is a very serious matter, but saving five lives is a greater good that might seem to outweigh the loss of one. A frequently mentioned example is that of the sheriff who is faced by an unruly mob threatening to burn down the goal and kill all its occupants unless he delivers an innocent prisoner to them to be lynched. On the basis of consequences alone it would follow that compliance would be justified in this case. It also follows from this utilitarian formula that it would be morally right for a mother to stifle the cries of her sick baby at the cost of its life in order to conceal the presence of a whole group of people who will otherwise be killed (utilitarian Joseph Fletcher says that in such a situation this is not only permissible but obligatory, because it is the loving thing to do). .  

The assassination of an incompetent ruler might seem to be justified by the greater good to the community resulting from a competent successor. Some moralists have defended the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the basis that many more lives were saved due to the swift ending of World War II that these nuclear bombings brought about. Again, utilitarian thinking leads to the conclusion that direct abortion is morally right to save the mother's life, either because it is not conceded that the foetus is a human being or because, even if this is admitted the mother's life takes precedence over that of the foetus. It is legitimate to ask whether this could be extended to include serious danger to the mother's health or the case of the woman pregnant as a result of rape.  

Many indeed in our society argue in this way, but many others are disturbed by the implications. Can the value of human life be measured like this? What happens to the individual person and the rights of the individual in such a theory? Justice, which we commonly understand as requiring us to respect individual rights, is not compatible with this way of thinking.  

Justice is likewise poorly served when there is question of the distribution of benefits and burdens in the community or among a class of people. If the total net welfare is taken as the criterion, some are going to miss out, probably the least well off or the most unimportant members of the group. On this basis physicians would give preference to patients most likely to benefit rapidly from treatment rather than the very ill and those at risk of dying, because this would cost less and be of greater benefit to the community. Experimentation on mentally handicapped children unable to give their consent would be justified by the benefits thereby accruing to the great majority of other children in the community, even if the handicapped did not themselves benefit. Prisoners could be made unwilling guinea pigs in experiments carried out in order to find a cure for AIDS. Scarce resources such as social services or hospitals or clinics or dialysis machines would be allocated where the greatest number would profit from their availability.  

This kind of cost/benefit analysis leads to conclusions that most of us would consider grossly unfair and that conflict with the compassion towards those most in need, which has traditionally marked the health care professions. In this way of thinking the individual is merged into the calculation of the common good and some people are made of greater worth than others. Most of us would feel uncomfortable with this. We want as a general rule to be fair to everybody and particularly to the underdog – the poor, the handicapped, the underprivileged. Indeed, for the Christian the Gospel insists that preference be given to these. Extraordinary circumstances, for example, a natural disaster such as a cyclone or an earthquake, where medical facilities are extremely limited, might require unusual measures like giving priority to those who can be saved over the 'hopeless' cases or first attending to an injured doctor or nurse who could then help others (the 'triage' situation). However, in normal everyday life the utilitarian cost/benefit formula by itself, that is, as the sole criterion of right and wrong, undermines respect for the worth of each individual person, who becomes a sort of 'product' in a business where you aim to get the most for your money and discard the inferior product.  

Contemporary utilitarians generally attempt to offset these difficulties by certain modifications to the original theory.  

1) Many say that the calculation of good results over bad must be looked at, not in relation to each particular act, but as regards what generally happens in human affairs. In the light of this, they maintain, it is possible from experience to formulate moral rules that will ensure the greatest happiness for the greatest number of those affected in any situation. So, for instance, not killing except in self-defence, telling the truth, paying debts, keeping promises, not stealing, are the right thing, nor necessarily because on a particular occasion they bring about the greatest good, but because the welfare of all is best achieved when all follow such rules. Particular exceptions prove the rule, literally put the rule to the test, so that if too many exceptions occur then the rule is either wrong or meaningless. For the utilitarian, no rule, even against killing the innocent, is completely exceptionless or unable to be changed. But, overall, it is better for the community and simpler for everybody to focus on rules rather than on particular acts.  

2) A second modification suggested is that, instead of looking at the short-term results, we should focus on what will happen in the long run. In the short term killing an innocent person might save the lives of ten others, but we must take into account the long-term social consequences of permitting this to happen, for example, the loss of respect for human life, which might far outweigh the saving in this case of the ten lives.  

3)Thirdly, it is suggested, account must be taken of the importance of institutions and conventions in society. Community life would be practically impossible if it could not normally be expected that truth would be told, debts would be paid and contracts would be honoured.  

These modifications temper some of the more unpalatable conclusions of utilitarianism, but the theory still has problems in accommodating justice as it is commonly understood, that is, as protective of all individuals in society and their inalienable rights. Many moralists hold strongly to the traditional way of thinking, that some actions at least are right or wrong in themselves, whatever the consequences.